

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

ACDE-00 /026 W

----- 086553

P R 051700Z AUG 75

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2689

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SALT TWO GENEVA 270

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 5, 1975

(SALT TWO - 712)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER  
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF AUGUST 5, 1975.

QUOTE

SEMENOV STATEMENT, AUGUST 5, 1975

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING, THE WORK  
OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON WORDING FOR INCLUSION IN THE DRAFT  
OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING PREPARED, IN A WORKING GROUP FOR  
EXAMPLE, IS PERFORMED AD REFERENDUM TO HEADS OF DELEGATION,  
WHILE THE RESULTS OF OUR WORK ARE AD REFERENDUM TO THE GOVERN-  
MENTS OF OUR COUNTRIES.

TODAY I HAVE OFFICIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO STATE THAT THE  
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SOVIET SIDE CONSIDERS THE AGREED PROVISIONS OF THE JOINT

DRAFT TEXT OF MAY 7, 1975 TO BE ACCEPTABLE. THUS, THE AFOREMENTIONED JOINT DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES THE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR AGREEING ON THE FURTHER PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

OF COURSE, DURING THE WORK OF AGREEING ON THE FORMULATIONS CONTAINED IN THE BRACKETED, THAT IS, SO FAR UNAGREED PORTIONS OF THE TEXT, AS WELL AS DURING THE NECESSARY CONFORMING OF THE RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH TEXTS, APPROPRIATE EDITORIAL OR CLARIFYING CHANGES OF AGREED LANGUAGE MAY BE REQUIRED.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE FACT THAT THE AGREED PORTIONS OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7, 1975 ARE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES PROVIDES A NEW IMPETUS TO THE WORK OF THE DELEGATIONS.

ON AUGUST 2, 1975, IN HELSINKI, A MEETING TOOK PLACE BETWEEN GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE L.I. BREZHNEV AND U.S. PRESIDENT GERALD FORD. DURING THAT MEETING, QUESTIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION RECEIVED MUCH ATTENTION. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE ISSUES ON WHICH UNDERSTANDING WAS REACHED DURING THE TALK BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF OUR STATES WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE DELEGATIONS TO BE PUT INTO APPROPRIATE FORM.

THE RESULTS OF THE HELSINKI NEGOTIATIONS CONFIRM THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OUR STATES ATTACH TO A CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THEY DEMONSTRATE ONCE AGAIN THE GREAT RESPONSIBILITY RESTING ON THE DELEGATIONS IN TERMS OF ACCOMPLISHING OUR ASSIGNED TASK.

THUS, OUR NEGOTIATIONS ENTER INTO A PERIOD OF INCREASINGLY INTENSIVE AND PURPOSEFUL WORK WHICH DEMANDS APPROPRIATE EFFORTS ON THE PART OF BOTH DELEGATIONS. TODAY WE FACE THE TASK OF ACTIVELY USING ALL AVAILABLE AND EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES TO BRING CLOSER TOGETHER AND FINALLY CONFORM THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES WITH RESPECT TO THE WORDING OF THE DRAFT BEING PREPARED.

IN THIS, THE PROVISIONS, WHICH THE DELEGATIONS WILL  
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PREPARE IN THE FUTURE FOR THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, MUST STRICTLY CONFORM TO THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN BOTH STATES AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AND RECORDED INTERALIA IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974. THEY MUST BE FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, WHICH IS TO BE THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING CONCLUDED.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

ACCORDING TO THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S., REACHED IN VLADIVOSTOK AS A RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, WHEN A BOMBER IS EQUIPPED WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, EACH SUCH MISSILE WILL BE COUNTED AS ONE UNIT IN THE TOTAL AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES.

THE AGREED DECISION TO COUNT EACH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED RANGE, WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH THEM, AS ONE UNIT WITHIN THE OVERALL AGGREGATE MAXIMUM LEVEL, SHOWS UNAMBIGUOUSLY THAT THE SIDES CONSIDER THIS STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLE AS SUBJECT TO LIMITATION, ALONG WITH SUCH TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS.

IN VIEW OF THE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE OF THIS QUESTION IN THE CONTEXT OF WORKING OUT MUTUALLY AGREED PROVISIONS FOR THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, TODAY I WOULD LIKE TO RE-EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR THE SIDES TO ASSUME OBLIGATIONS NOT TO EQUIP ANY TYPE OF AIRPLANE, HELICOPTER OR OTHER AIRCRAFT, OTHER THAN BOMBERS, WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS. SUCH AN OBLIGATION, TOGETHER WITH THE OBLIGATION NOT TO USE TRANSPORT AIRPLANES AS DELIVERY VEHICLES FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OR CONVERT THEM FOR THESE PURPOSES, IS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE IX OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7, 1975.

THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE IX ARE BASED ON WEIGHTY CONSIDERATIONS: THEY STEM FROM THE CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974 AND SERVE THE PURPOSE  
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OF ENHANCING THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FUTURE AGREEMENT; THIS IS IN THE MUTUAL INTEREST OF THE SIDES.

INDEED, LET US IMAGINE A SITUATION IN WHICH AIRPLANES, HELICOPTERS AND OTHER AIRCRAFT, OTHER THAN BOMBERS, WERE TO BE EQUIPPED WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, I.E. WITH ONE OF THE TYPES OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLE BEING LIMITED. SUCH A SITUATION WOULD CONSTITUTE NOTHING BUT A BUILDUP IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THROUGH DEPLOYMENT OF THESE MISSILES.

IT FOLLOWS MOST OBVIOUSLY FROM THE ABOVE THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST PROVIDE FOR A MUTUAL OBLIGATION, WHICH PRECLUDES THE POSSIBILITY OF CIRCUMVENTING OR UNDERMINING THE OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF

STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES TO A MAXIMUM AGGREGATE LEVEL OF 2,400 UNITS, THROUGH DEPLOYMENT OF AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS ON OTHER AIRCRAFT. THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE IX OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7, 1975 ARE IN LINE WITH PRECISELY THIS TASK.

IN THIS CONNECTION I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE ASSERTIONS CONTAINED IN THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT OF JULY 7, 1975, ALLEGING THAT THE SOVIET POSITION GOES BEYOND THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING BY CONTAINING A BAN ON AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES ON AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN BOMBERS, ARE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED. QUITE THE REVERSE. THE OBLIGATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THAT ARTICLE, WHICH BAN EQUIPPING AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN BOMBERS WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, TOGETHER WITH THE OBLIGATION NOT TO USE TRANSPORT AIRPLANES AS NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES OR CONVERT THEM FOR THESE PURPOSES, ARE FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE AND THE OBJECTIVES AND TASKS OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

IN THE PREVIOUS STATEMENTS THE USSR DELEGATION ALREADY DISCUSSED THE ADVISABILITY OF ASSUMING THE MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS ENVISAGED IN THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE IX WITH A VIEW TO EMBODYING IN THE NEW AGREEMENT AN EXISTING UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S., WHICH WAS REACHED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. WE REAFFIRM THE SOVIET SIDE'S POSITION OF  
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PRINCIPLE ON THIS ISSUE. THE SOVIET SIDE FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT THE OBLIGATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE IX OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

UNQUOTE JOHNSON

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** AGREEMENT DRAFT, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, MEETING DELEGATIONS, SPEECHES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 05 AUG 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975SALTT00270  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** X1  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750270-0214  
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**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 21 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <21 APR 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <15 JUL 2003 by GarlanWA>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 5, 1975 (SALT TWO - 712)  
**TAGS:** PARM, (SEME NOV, V S)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006